





Security in a University Environment

Randy Marchany
VA Tech Computing Center
Blacksburg, VA 24060
Marchany@vt.edu


Top 10 Viruses Intercepted





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



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Elvis Vidal, left, watches Tis Adams for cues before a performance near the Good Shepherd Music Center in Adams-Morgan. The center, housed in the basement of the Ontario Court apartments, sponsored

yesterday's outdoor event to celebrate a commitment businesses to help renovate the center. The program a children build self-esteem as they develop music skills

Hackers Breach GMU Computers, Zap Students'

By Ann O'Hanlon
Washington Post Staff Writer

Hackers have broken into computers at George Mason University 12 times since February, and in the most recent incident, they deleted academic work for 400 computer and engineering students, authorities said.

Campus and Fairfax County police are investigating the incidents, and they have filed charges against two students in connection with a February break-in.

Much of the information lost in the latest, and most serious, attack—which occurred three weeks ago—was recovered from backup systems. But because the most recent backup of data had been done a month earlier, many students lost extensive work they had performed over the summer, faculty members said.

Three master's degree candidates working with George Mason professor Jeff Offutt could not recover any of their semester projects. "A lot of people are very upset

because it's been a major loss of work and a major annoyance," Offutt said.

"One person came into my office crying. . . . She was saying, 'Please, it wasn't my fault. It wasn't my fault. It was working. You can ask my friends who saw it.' She just kept saying it over and over. I felt so sorry for her."

Attacks by computer vandals are nearly as old as computing, but experts say such incidents may be growing more common and more malicious.

"We are seeing a real increase," said Ch. founder of Inter. tems in Atlanta, accounts for about He attributed the number of people the . . . tools th more available to

George Mas. working to improve system but are o work and had fai

See GMU,

Two Sue GMU for \$4.5 Million

Men Say They Were Falsely Accused in Computer Hacking Probe

ERICA BESHEARS
Washington Post Staff Writer

An alumnus and a current student who say they were falsely accused of hacking into the computer system at George Mason University have filed a \$4.5 million lawsuit against the school for defamation of character and false imprisonment.

An attorney for Robert Shvern, of Fairfax County, and Ryan Whelan, 25, of Centreville, said the men suffered great embarrassment and damage to their reputations and lost jobs and money as a result of charges filed against them last summer, which were later dropped.

Shvern, who graduated with a degree in computer science in 1996, and Whelan, a student since 1991, filed the lawsuit in Fairfax County Circuit Court on Aug. 5, naming the university and eight of its officials as defendants. The suit claims the university violated their civil rights by acting without probable cause when it investigated them.

The plaintiffs believe the prosecution was instigated out of malice without a legal and factual basis that they suffered damages as a result of it," said Chanda L. Kinsey, attorney for Shvern and Whelan.

Kinsey said an employer withdrew a job offer to Shvern after

reading accounts of the charges in local newspapers, forcing Shvern to accept a job with less pay. Whelan owns a computer business called Two Radical Technologies, which also is named as a plaintiff in the suit. Kinsey said Whelan lost several clients after the charges were filed.

The lawsuit states that the university used an unproven computer audit system to identify the culprit in a February 1997 hacking incident, and that the audit was carried out by a university official—Donald Desrosiers—who had a personal dispute with Shvern.

Shvern and Whelan also allege that the university police department arrested them without probable cause, knowing that the audit would not stand up in court.

University officials said they would not comment on pending legal action.

Between February and August of last year, George Mason University suffered 12 computer break-ins by hackers.

In the first incident, hackers inserted a program into the school's computer system that sent derogatory e-mail messages about the chairman of the Computer Science Department and the school's Security Review Panel to administrative committees under the names of

random students and staff members. Another break-in last summer deleted academic work for 400 computer and engineering students.

Shvern and Whelan were arrested in July 1997 in connection with the first incident. Shvern was charged with altering computer data, a felony; with willfully using a computer network without authority; and with causing a computer to malfunction. Whelan was charged with being an accessory to the crime.

The lawsuit claims that university officials in their public statements intended to falsely incriminate Shvern and Whelan in the incident that deleted students' academic work.

Charges against Shvern were dismissed at a preliminary hearing in March when a judge ruled that the evidence was insufficient to refer the case to a grand jury. Whelan's charge was dropped a month later.

No one else has been charged in connection with any of the hacking incidents, officials said.

George Mason University has worked since last year to bolster security of its computer system by creating a committee to develop new policies, spokesman Dan Walsch said.

CRIME JUSTICE

Man Arrested in Alexandria Carjacking

A 27-year-old Emporia, Va., man has been arrested in California in connection with a December carjacking in which a police officer and a motorist were shot, officials said yesterday.

Eddie O. Lee was arrested about 6 p.m. Monday at a rooming house by members of the FBI's Fugitive Task Force, which issued a warrant charging him with the carjacking, officials said.

On Dec. 26, an Alexandria officer tried to stop a person at the corner of Montrose Avenue and Lee Avenue. A scuffle ensued, and there was an exchange of gunfire. After shooting the officer in the hand and leg, Lee approached a vehicle, shot the driver in the shoulder and fled out of her car, officials said. The gunman fled in a white car at the intersection of Jefferson Davis Highway and Lee Avenue. He threatened another motorist and took his vehicle.

Lee is being held in Los Angeles pending an arrest on the carjacking charge. Lee is also wanted on firearms charges in Emporia.

Leesburg Woman Arrested in Poisoning

A 51-year-old Leesburg woman has been charged with poisoning after she told officers she spiked her husband's beer with bug spray, police said yesterday.

Minnie Bell Hensley, of Adams Drive NE, was arrested and released on a \$5,000 personal recognizance bond.

Francis Fewell, 55, who shares the home with Hensley, opened the soda about 4 a.m. Aug. 10, took a sip of the soda and noticed a "strange" taste. He then filed a criminal complaint filed in Loudoun County General District Court.

"After she drank it, she became ill and nauseous," Hensley said. The contents of the can had been tampered with, spokesman, Capt. Claggett Moxley, said.

Fewell brought the can to the police station. Moxley said. Hensley, brought in for questioning, she put bug spray in the drink to make Fewell ill. Documents. Police declined to comment on a comment on a comment. Neither Fewell or Hensley could be reached for comment.



Partly sunny and warm

Highs: 70°-75°

Lows: 45°-50°

TOMORROW

Chance of showers

Highs: 65°-70°

Lows: 35°-40°

COLLEGIATE TIMES

97th Year, No. 44 • Blacksburg, Virginia • Friday, November 3, 2000

An independent student-run newspaper serving the Virginia Tech community since 1903

Tech computer used in Yankees hacking

by Brian McNeill
News Editor

A Virginia Tech computer was used in the hacking of the New York Yankees' website during the World Series last week, authorities said.

"A machine in the electrical engineering department was compromised by someone and was used in the Yankees hack," said Randy Marchany, a computer systems engineer and member of the computer incident response team, which handles online security for the university.

The hackers changed the Yankees.com numerical web address so online traffic would

the electrical engineering department, Marchany said.

Surfers expecting to see the Yankees' website were then greeted with pornographic pictures and the message "Yankees suck."

The FBI's New York office is looking into the crime.

"We are still investigating the hack of the Yankees' website," said Jim Margolin, special agent of the New York office of the FBI.

However, specific details of the investigation could not be disclosed until more developments unfold in the case, Margolin said.

"Since the investigation is ongoing, I can't say whether we have any strong leads or if there are any suspects," he said.

Marchany said he expects the hackers will most likely be caught in the near future.

"The FBI has a lot of evidence and we have a lot of evidence," he said. "We were very fast in containing the problem once we were notified of it."

Yankees.com notified Tech of the hack after their online security determined the connection to the electrical engineering computer, Marchany said.

The hackers do not necessarily have any connection to Tech, Marchany said, because the attack could have been perpetrated from any-

where. Hackers search the entire Internet to locate computer weaknesses they can exploit, he said.

"I think there are people that regularly scan the entire Internet for vulnerable machines," he said. "It's almost as if you were to try to open the door to every home in Blacksburg, document the results and go back later and break in."

Tech has had its share of computer attacks over the years, but the computer incident response team has always quickly solved the situations, Marchany said.

"In the past 10 years, there have been probably five major attacks," he said. "We've been very good about isolating and correcting the problems."







Articles

- [Attacking Solaris with Loadable Kernel Modules \(example modules\)](#)
by Plasmoid
- [Attacking FreeBSD with Kernel Modules \(example modules\)](#)
by Pragmatic
- [Anonymizing Unix Systems](#)
by van Hauser
- [LKM- Loadable Linux Kernel Modules](#)
by pragmatic
- [Human 2 Hacker v1.1 - german article](#)
by Tick
- [Placing Backdoors Through Firewalls](#)
by van Hauser [\(rwwwshell.pl\)](http://rwwwshell.pl)

Magazines

■ [THC-Magazine #4](#)

Magazine Issue #4 (german only) features Dialup/PBX Hacking, German Telekom: Sept, T-Box, Passwords and much more.



ews

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rticles

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ome

- [THC-Secure Deletion 2.2](#)

If you overwrite a file for 10+ times, it can *still* be recovered. Read why and use the programs included (w/src!). Written by van Hauser.

- [THC-Credit Version 1.9](#)

World's best Credit Card Generator, checks and generates over hundreds of different card types including newest bank ids and standarts. For all you horny guys who always wanted an account at Amateurs or Dirtybird, NOW supporting magnetic card reader and writer for MASTER/VISA/EC/etc cards.

- [THC-PBX Hacker Version 1.1](#)

A tool to automatically hack any pbx, handles up to 10 different pbx numbers with features like random dialing, random dial/tone speed and length, completely programmable and much more. This will trick out any pattern detection switch.

- [THC-Login Hacker Version 1.1](#)

Powerfull script language to hack terminal logins via dictionary- or bruteforce-hacking. Configurable for telnet and dialup hacking, extreme large command base.

- [THC-RA Hacking Kit #1](#)

Backdoors, viris, traps and explanations for RemoteAccess BBS hacking. Sophisticated ways of getting hidden into BBS systems. Issue #1

- [THC-RA Hacking Kit #2](#)

LmT and r00tcrew 0wN'z y0u! :-)



Frequently Asked Questions (FAQ's)

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r friends, who
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House Floor This Week

House Floor Now

Senate Schedule

LAMERS' TEAM

k1ck3r
null
shr1k3

Search CURRENT CONGRESS for XXX filez, movies, picz:

By Size By The Way

NEW [This web site was change by the group LmT!](#)
[All goodies goes to k1ck3r, null, shr1k3 and AngelFire!!!](#)

LEGISLATION

CONGRESSIONAL
RECORD

COMMITTEE
INFORMATION

Who are LmT?

We are 4 hackers from a
little country in Europe! :)

You can reach us ..

k1ck3r

If you want to grow as
individual you must first
expand your mind.

null

-=# shr1k3 #-

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gr33tZ 2 a|| dud3Z r0ud m3!

shr1k3

I'd (k1ck3r) like to thanks to
my girlfriend **Zlidka** and all
the people which are around
me and help me to live. :-]

And least we call our selves
LmT and work together with
r00t-cReW.

Special thanks to rage & p0||y
.. da ozdrowiawash byrzo che
ako znaesh kak shte
izbuhnem na deepzone
:))))))))))



RSA
SECURITY

RSA Security inc. Hacked.
Trust us with your data! Praise Allah!

The most trusted name
in E-security
has been owned.

Big things
are coming.



Copyright © 2000 Coolio

- Hello **aforce!**
- Girls are stupid and easy
- **RSA Laboratories Unveils Innovative** [countermeasure](#) to recent "Denial of Service" Hacker Attacks". Keep your data safe with us! Our security is the best.

OWNED BY COOLIO

about us

forums

assessment

defense

papers

magazines

misc

links

careers

Welcome to the NT Hacking Text Files Section.

To Change, Click On The Category.

Sorted By: File Name.


[NT / docs /](#)

File Name	Downloads	File Size	Last Modified
cgimail-NT-hack.htm	3339	2505	Aug 16 17:03:38 1999
Sorry, a description is unavailable.			
cracknt.zip	4731	114470	Aug 16 17:03:39 1999
Sorry, a description is unavailable.			
ftpbounce-attack.htm	3217	6193	Aug 16 17:03:38 1999
Sorry, a description is unavailable.			
ftpcrack.htm	3467	3892	Aug 16 17:03:39 1999
Sorry, a description is unavailable.			
getadmin.htm	4487	1622	Aug 16 17:03:38 1999
Getting local admin rights on a NT system. Probably outdated.			
hacking-NT.htm	5950	8403	Aug 16 17:03:38 1999
Sorry, a description is unavailable.			
index.bak	370	2139	Aug 16 17:03:39 1999
index.bak			
ipccrack.htm	3622	2820	Aug 16 17:03:39 1999
Sorry, a description is unavailable.			
ms2-proxyserver.txt	3391	29655	Aug 16 17:03:39 1999
Understanding Microsoft Proxy Server 2.0, By NeonSurge of Rhino9.			
netbios.htm	4151	1095	Aug 16 17:03:39 1999
Sorry, a description is unavailable.			
NTExploits.txt	9395	36669	Aug 16 17:03:39 1999
NT Exploitation Techniques, Revision 5 - Step-by-step guide to exploiting NT insecurities. By vacuum .			
null.sessions.html	1001	24170	Aug 16 17:03:38 1999
Excellent detailed explanation describing how to programmatically connect to NT Server NULL Sessions and extract the name of the true administrator account. By JD Glaser, NT OBJECTives, Inc. , 24.170 kb.			
perl.exe-NT-crack.ht.>	3126	4669	Aug 16 17:03:38 1999
Sorry, a description is unavailable.			
sid.htm	3332	8117	Aug 16 17:03:38 1999
Sorry, a description is unavailable.			
sid.zip	2463	50773	Aug 16 17:03:38 1999
Sorry, a description is unavailable.			
test4gst.txt	2872	644	Aug 16 17:03:39 1999
A Win32 Perl based scanner which checks Class C Networks for NT or UNIX machines running SAMBA with default guest accounts.			





- KaZaA is another file sharing program that lets users download music, pictures, software, video clips and more.
- The fine print in the license agreement has something nasty.



KaZaA License Agreement

- You hereby grant Brilliant Digital Entertainment the right to access and use the unused computing power and storage space on your computer/s and/or Internet access or bandwidth for the aggregation of content and use in distributed computing. The use acknowledges and authorizes this use without the right of compensation.



It Can't Happen Here

- 1984 – student sends obscene email to female faculty
- 1991 – Major Unix break-in, 18 machines, 5 depts, hackers from all over the world, discussed in the book @Large
- 1993 – Illegal music sites start to appear on VT systems
- 1995 – Student obtains test from faculty Mac ahead of time
- 1996 – Major relay attack, VT system used to attack other sites, AF-OSI/FBI involved



It Can't Happen Here

- 1996 – Student changes grades on instructor's PC
- 1996 – Anonymous email harassment from public VT systems
- 1996 – Hackers attack system in MCB, capture passwords from 3 depts
- 1996 – Secret Service investigates VT student for threat to the President via email
- 1996 – female instructor harassed via email on class listserv



It Can't Happen Here

- 1996 – CO system attacked by BEV user
- 1996 – VT student captures 300 passwords in a dorm and changes them on 4/1/96
- 1997 – VT WWW site modified illegally
- 1997 – Dept. WWW sites attacked
- 1997 – VT student send hate mail to gay www site. VT Provost gets > 500 emails protesting this attack, story appears in NY Times, Washington Post, LA Times, CT, local PBS



It Can't Happen Here

- 1997 – VT student sent to judicial review for email harassment & threats
- 1997 – Pirated software sites on VT systems
- 1997 – VT system attacked from outside, FBI involved
- 1997 – Hackers attack VT system to attack Canadian systems, RCMP/FBI involved
- 1998 – Hackers attack VT system to attack PSU systems
- 1998 – Dept lab attacked by disgruntled former grad student




It Can't Happen Here

- 1998 – EE, Emporium labs attacked by hackers
- 1999 – BO, Netbus, Email attachment attacks arrive
- 1999 – +80 VT systems attacked to be used in DDOS attacks. FBI involved
- 2000 – Email harassment attacks continue
- 2000 – Remote control trojan attacks increase like VNC I showed you
- 2001 – VT systems continually probed for vulnerabilities



Four Initiatives To Fight Back

- Incident Response Team - sharing
- Education - sharing
- Policies – especial AUP
- STAR



Policies that Work



History

- 1989: I asked “Do we have a policy”
- 1990: first draft of the AUP
 - #2000 – adopted 1989, revised 1999
 - Management of University Records
 - #2005 – adopted 1989, revised 1999
 - Administrative Data Management and Access Policy
 - **#2015(AUP) – adopted 1991, revised 1999**
 - Acceptable Use Guidelines contain specific examples
 - #2020 – adopted 1991, removal pending
 - Policy on Protecting Electronic Access Privilege
 - #2030 – adopted 2000
 - Policy on Privacy Statements on VT WWW sites



AUP Enforcement Philosophy

- Avoid repeating sanctions – they are in existing policies and sanctions
 - Sanctions are described in Student, Faculty and Staff Handbooks
 - Judicial procedure is defined there also
- Maintain compliance with Federal, state and local Computer Crime statutes.
 - Academic freedom vs. illegal activity



Acceptable Use Policy

- Scope

- All VT-owned computer & communications facilities dealing with voice, video and data
- VT Networks, mainframe, midrange, minicomputer, workstation and PC
- No individually owned computers – until they connect to the VT network.



Acceptable Use Policy

- Demonstrates Respect of:
 - Privacy rights of others
 - Intellectual property rights (copyrights, patents)
 - **Data ownership**
 - Defense mechanisms
 - **Freedom from harassment, intimidation**



Acceptable Use – The Do's

- Use resources **for authorized purposes only**
 - Porno, personal business – violation!
- Responsibility
 - You're responsible for anything that originates from your system/userid.
- Permission
 - Access only what you've been given permission
 - You can share your userid/system but see previous point
 - Use only legal copyrighted software or data
- Refrain from overloading resources
 - Spam, DOS attacks



Acceptable Use – The DONT's

- Use another's system, userid, data, files or password without permission
- Use hacking programs, willfully spread viruses to break system security or disrupt services
- Make illegal copies of copyrighted materials, store them on VT systems or transmit them on VT networks
 - MP3, Napster, DVD is ok as long as copyrights are respected. (no music without permission)
 - You become a "distributor" – one kid who refused to eliminate all files brought up under judicial review and had a "suspended suspension."



Acceptable Use – The DON'Ts

- Use **email** or messaging services to **harass**, intimidate or threaten others
 - Most common offense
- Use VT systems for personal gain (your new startup company)
- Use VT systems for illegal purposes



Acceptable Use - Enforcement

- AUP violations are a serious offense
- **VT reserves the right to copy and examine any file on VT systems allegedly related to AUP violations in order to protect its resources (no search warrant needed for VT system)**
 - Done only with the approval of supervisory or legal entities. Does NOT apply to personal systems
- FERPA, ECPA, Computer Fraud & Abuse Act, Computer Virus Eradication Act, VA Computer Crime Law, HIPPA, Interstate Transportation of Stolen Property Act



Acceptable Use - Statistics

- Students

- 1998: 5 cases formally adjudicated
- 1999: 1200 complaints, 25 cases formally adjudicated
- Gender based harassment, copyright infringement pose significant contributory liability concerns for the University
- Data from Office of Judicial Affairs annual report



Acceptable Use - Summary

- Comprehensive
- Flexible
- Use existing University Policies for enforcement
- Binding to all VT members
- Available at <http://security.vt.edu>, click on the Acceptable Use Guidelines



STAR

- How do you get the auditors, the security staff, and the systems administrators to all work together, and do it willingly?
- First make their jobs easier
- Then get senior management to require participation
- Get all three groups reading off the same page



STAR: Security Technology Assessment and Review

- Value your information assets
- Assess your risks
- Deploy risk-mitigating controls for maximum effect
- Create measures that drive human behavior

List your Assets

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4	C	HOST.DEPT.ORG	Physical Plant /Environmental Servers				
5	C	HOST.DEPT.ORG	(in general)				
6	C	HOST.DEPT.ORG	DNS Name Server (secondary)				
7	C	HOST.DEPT.ORG	The Company Network (routers, servers, modems, etc.)				
8	E	HOST.DEPT.ORG	HR Database Server				
9	E	HOST.DEPT.ORG	Payroll Server				
10	N	HOST.DEPT.ORG	Production Control Servers				
11	N	HOST.DEPT.ORG	Client systems - Win95/NT, Macs				
12	N	HOST.DEPT.ORG	Database Group "crash and burn" system				
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Assets Asset Weighting Risks Risk Weighting Asset-Risk Matrix

Ready NUM

Rank your Assets

Microsoft Excel - genrisk:2

File Edit View Insert Format Tools Data Window Help

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22	54.5		##		9.0		2.5		4.5		6.0		2.5		0.0		5.5		4.0		6.0		9.0		##												
23			12		0.0		0.5		0.5		0.0		0.5		8.0		3.0		4.5		3.0		0.0		0.5		12										
24	84.5		##		9.0		8.5		8.5		9.0		8.5		1.0		6.0		4.5		6.0		9.0		8.5		##										
25			13				2.0		5.0		0.0		2.0		7.5		2.5		5.0		4.0		0.0		5.0		6.0		13								

Assets Asset Weighting Risks Risk Weighting Asset-Risk Matrix

Ready NUM

List your Risks

Microsoft Excel - genrisk:2

File Edit View Insert Format Tools Data Window Help

Geneva 10 B I U \$ % , +.00 -.00 100%


A1 = Pri

	A	B	C	F	G	H
1	Pri	Risk	Description			
2	C	Cleartext	Clear text data moving among our systems and networks			
3	C	Client system access control	Control of access to distributed desktop client workstations			
4	C	Construction mistakes	Service interruptions during construction/renovations			
5	C	Key person dependency	Too few staff to cover critical responsibilities			
6	C	Natural disaster	Flood, earthquake, fire, etc.			
7	C	Passwords	Selection, security, number of passwords, etc.			
8	C	Physical Security (IS internal)	IS private space (Machine room, wire closets, offices...)			
9	C	Physical Security (IS external)	IS public space (Laboratories, classrooms, library, ...)			
10	C	Spoofing	e-mail and IP address forgery or circumvention			
11	C	Data Disclosure	Inappropriate acquisition or release of university data			
12	C	System Administration Practices	Adequacy of knowledge, skills, and procedures			
13	C	Operational Policies	appropriate strategies, directions, and policies			
14						
15						
16						
17						
18						
19						
20						

Assets Asset Weighting **Risks** Risk Weighting Asset-Risk Matrix

Ready NUM

Rank your Risks



Map your Assets & Risks

Microsoft Excel - genrisk:2

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Geneva 9 B I U \$ % , .00 .00 100%

A15 = site 13

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P
1	Assets/Risks		System Administration Practices	Cleartext*	Passwords	Key person dependency	Physical Security (IS internal)	Data Disclosure	Operational Policies	Client system access control	Spoofing	Physical Security (IS external)	Construction mistakes	Natural disaster		
2		Wt.	89.0	72.0	64.5	63.5	60.0	52.0	51.0	50.5	50.5	31.0	8.0	2.5		
3	site1	106	9390	7596	6805	6699	6330	5486	5381	5328	5328	3271	844	264		
4	site 2	84.5	7521	6084	5450	5366	5070	4394	4310	4267	4267	2620	676	211		
5	site 3	70.5	6275	5076	4547	4477	4230	3666	3596	3560	3560	2186	564	176		
6	site 4	70.5	6275	5076	4547	4477	4230	3666	3596	3560	3560	2186	564	176		
7	site 5	69	6141	4968	4451	4382	4140	3588	3519	3485	3485	2139	552	173		
8	site 6	62.5	5563	4500	4031	3969	3750	3250	3188	3156	3156	1938	500	156		
9	site 7	54.5	4851	3924	3515	3461	3270	2834	2780	2752	2752	1690	436	136		
10	site 8	54.5	4851	3924	3515	3461	3270	2834	2780	2752	2752	1690	436	136		
11	site 9	47	4183	3384	3032	2985	2820	2444	2397	2374	2374	1457	376	118		

Assets Asset Weighting Risks Risk Weighting Asset-Risk Matrix

Ready NUM

List the Controls Available for Mitigating your Risks

Microsoft Excel - genrisk:2

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Geneva 10 B I U Font Size

	A	B	C	D	E
1	Num	Control			
2	1	Access Control Cards			
3	2	Alarm Systems			
4	3	ANO			
5	4	APOP			
6	5	Authentication between Backup servers			
7	6	Backup staff, Redundant Responsibilities			
8	7	Backups (for Data and Software)			
9	8	Central pw authentication (VTAUTH, Kerberos, etc.)			
10	9	Incident Response (communicating about security related problems)			
11	10	(null)			
12	11	Digital Certificates & Signatures			
13	12	(null)			
14	13	Documented procedures			
15	14	Education & Training			
16	15	Hardware backups			
17	16	Insurance and self-insurance			
18	17	(null)			
19	18	Limited IP filtering			
20	19	Miss Utility service			
21	20	Monitors (for labs, classrooms, etc.)			
22	21	Non SSN ID Number			
23	22	Off-site backups, redundant systems			
24	23	PC/Mac/NT access control (On-guard, At Ease, etc.)			
25	24	Password aging			
26	25	Password Checkers (strength checkers, crack, etc.)			

Asset-Risk Matrix Controls Control Matrix Controls(rank ordered)

Ready NUM

Map your Controls onto your Assets & Risks

Microsoft Excel - genrisk:2

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Geneva 9 B I U \$ % , +.00 -.00 100%

A15 = site 13

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J	K	L	M	N	O	P
1	Assets/Risks & Controls		System Administration Practices	Cleartext*	Passwords	Key person dependency	Physical Security (IS internal)	Data Disclosure	Operational Policies	Client system access control	Spoofing	Physical Security (IS external)	Construction mistakes	Natural disaster		
2		Wt.	89.0	72.0	64.5	63.5	60.0	52.0	51.0	50.5	50.5	31.0	8.0	2.5		
3	site 1	106	7,13,14,30,33	34,37,38	8,25,37	6,13,14	1,2,28,29,39	N/A	9,24,33	14,23	18	1,2,28,29,39	15,16,19,32	15,16,22,30,32		
4	site 2	84.5	7,13,14,33	27,24,37,38	8,11,25,37	6,13,14	1,2,28,29	5,21,27,37,38	9,21,24,33	14,23	11,27	1,2,28,29,39	15,16,19,32	15,16,22,30,32		
5	site 3	70.5	7,13,14,33	27,24,37,38	8,11,25,37	6,13,14	1,2,28,29	5,21,27,37,38	9,21,24,33	14,23	11,27	1,2,28,29,39	15,16,19,32	15,16,22,30,32		
6	site 4	70.5	7,13,14,33	27,24,37,38	8,11,25,37	6,13,14	1,2,28,29	5,21,27,37,38	9,21,24,33	14,23	11,27	1,2,28,29,39	15,16,19,32	15,16,22,30,32		
7	site 5	69	7,13,14,33	27,24,37,38	8,11,25,37	6,13,14	1,2,28,29	5,21,27,37,38	9,21,24,33	14,23	11,27	1,2,28,29,39	15,16,19,32	15,16,22,30,32		
8	site 6	62.5	7,13,14,33	27,24,36,37,38	8,11,25,37	6,13,14	1,2,28,29	5,21,27,37,38	9,21,24,33	14,23,36	11,27	1,2,28,29,39	15,16,19,32	15,16,22,30,32		
9	site 7	54.5	7,13,14,33	27,24,37,38	8,11,25,37	6,13,14	1,2,28,29	5,21,27,37,38	9,21,24,33	14,23	11,27	1,2,28,29,39	15,16,19,32	15,16,22,30,32		
10	site 8	54.5	7,13,14,33	27,24,37,38	8,11,25,37	6,13,14	1,2,28,29	5,21,27,37,38	9,21,24,33	14,23	11,27	1,2,28,29,39	15,16,19,32	15,16,22,30,32		
11	site 9	47	7,13,14,18,33	4,27,24,37,38	8,11,25,37	6,13,14	1,2,28,29	5,18,21,27,37,38	9,21,24,33	14,23	11,18,27	1,2,28,29,39	15,16,19,32	15,16,22,30,32		
			7,13,14	27,24,37	8,11,25			5,21,27	9,21,24			1,2,28,29	15,16,19	15,16,22		

Asset-Risk Matrix Controls Control Matrix Controls(rank ordered)

Ready NUM

Deploy your Controls for Maximum Effectiveness

Microsoft Excel - genrisk:2

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Geneva 10 B I U

A1 = Num

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G
1	Num	Control	Value				
2	14	Education & Training	142506				
3	37	SSH	126841				
4	13	Documented procedures	107055				
5	27	Public Key Encryption	104089				
6	38	SSL	81562				
7	24	Password aging	78750				
8	11	Digital Certificates & Signatures	68598				
9	1	Access Control Cards	63882				
10	2	Alarm Systems	63882				
11	28	Physical Inventory	63882				
12	29	Physical Keys	63882				
13	7	Backups (for Data and Software)	62478				
14	33	Security Scanning Software (e.g. SATAN)	62478				
15	21	Non SSN ID Number	61440				
16	8	Central pw authentication (VTAUTH, Kerberos, etc.)	45279				
17	25	Password Checkers (strength checkers, crack, etc.)	45279				
18	6	Backup staff, Redundant Responsibilities	44577				
19	9	Incident Response (communicating about security related pr	35802				
20	23	PC/Mac/NT access control (On-guard, At Ease, etc.)	35451				
21	5	Authentication between Backup servers	31018				
22	39	Video Cameras	21762				
23	34	SCP part of SSH	7596				
24	15	Hardware backups	7371				
25	16	Insurance and self-insurance	7371				
26	32	Redundant routing	7371				

Controls Control Matrix Controls(rank ordered)

Ready NUM

Audit Compliance Status

Microsoft Excel - gencomp

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Arial 10 B I U \$ % , .00 .00 100%

E24 = OK

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I
		IS ASSETS	Site 1	Site 2	Site 3	Site 4	Site 5	Site 6	
10	Unix Security Risks								
11									
12	OVERALL		OK						
13									
14	Sys Admin Practices		OK	OK					
15									
16	Data Disclosure		FAIL	OK	CAUTION				
17									
18	Passwords		OK	CAUTION	OK				
19									
20	Key Person Dependency		OK	FAIL	FUTURE	FUTURE		FUTURE	

Sheet1 Sheet2 Sheet3 Sheet1 (2) Sheet6 Sheet5 Sheet4

Ready

Assets/Risks Status

Microsoft Excel - gencomp

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Arial 10 B I U \$ % , +.0 -.00 +.00

F14 = FAIL

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
4	Color Codes defined in Sheet 1	RISKS	Poor Sysadmin Practices	No Backups	Poor Password Selection	Clear Text WWW	Clear Text Telnet	Client System Access Control	Cleartext Oracle Clients	Cleartext PW changes
5	ASSET									
6										
7	Asset 1		OK							
8	Asset 2									
9	Asset 3				FAIL			CAUTION		

Ready NUM

Controls Status by Asset

Microsoft Excel - gencomp

File Edit View Insert Format Tools Data Window Help

Arial 10 B I U \$ % , +.00 +.00 100%

F18 =

	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	I	J
1	Control Matrix									
2										
3	Color codes defined in Sheet 1									
4										
5	Controls			Site 1	Site 2	Site 3				
6										
7	Digital Signatures									
8	SQL Secure									
9	ANO									
10	PGP									
11	APOP									
12	VTAUTH									
13	SSH									
14	Non SSN ID Number									
15	Education									
16	Password Checkers									
17	Kerberos									

Sheet1 Sheet2 **Sheet3** Sheet1 (2) Sheet6 Sheet5 Sheet4 Sheet


Ready NUM

Detailed Audit Compliance Status

Microsoft Excel - gencomp						
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Arial 10 B I U [Formatting Icons] 100%						
D89						
A	B	C	D	E	F	
		VT IS Assets	Network	site 2	site 3	
10	Unix Security Risks					
11						
12	OVERALL					
13						
14	SYSTEM ADMINISTRATION PRACTICES					
15	AUDIT					
16	Ensure audit subsystem is enabled					
17	Verify kernel audit events not modified improperly					
18	Audit correctly configured?					
19	System Selectable audit events?					
20	Verify unsuccessful login attempts are recorded					
21	System detect when audit file reaches capacity					
22	Determine if audit reduction capability exists					
23	Identify users for whom auditing has been disabled					
24	Verify required parameters for each recorded event are identified					

Detailed Audit Compliance Status

Computer Security & Audit Matrix - I								
	VT IS Assets	Network	site 2	site 3	site 4	site 5	site 6	
5	Unix Security Risks							
6								
7	KEY PERSON DEPENDENCY							
8	Identify system managers and their backups							
9	Determine Problem reporting procedure							
10								
11	PHYSICAL SECURITY							
12	Is the system in a controlled area?							
13	the controlled area? Are accesses logged?							
14	ord serial numbers of all system, peripherals							



Benefits to User Organizations

- List of risks they hadn't considered
- List of assets that are at risk
- List of controls – possible solutions
- Decision-making process is up to them



Benefits to Auditors

- Amount of work reduced in 2nd year and beyond
- Consistent reports
- Comparisons and trend analysis



Benefits to Incident Response People

- Do not get auditor information
- But, if problem occurs, can get good picture of what controls were on which machine



Benefits To System Managers

- Provides answer to management of “Where are we now and what do we need to do to get to a reasonable level”
- New: using Center for Internet Security scoring tools – because that catches management’s eyes.
- Once they saw the scores (1-10) they demanded action.
- Auditor’s like it, too.



New Additions at the Web Site

- Business Impact Analysis/Risk Assessment Template
- Emergency Response Plan

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Virginia Tech

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 Know The Rules

It is a good idea to familiarize yourself with the rules and regulations that govern your use of computers and other systems.

- [Report A Violation](#)
- [University Policies](#)
- [State & Federal Organizations](#)
- [Special Interest Organizations](#)

 Play It Safe

The best way to protect yourself is to not put yourself into situations that put you or your data at risk. These tools allow you to analyze your risk and take preventative measures.

- [Protective Software](#)
- [Business Recovery Plan](#)
- [Risk Analysis \(STAR\)](#)
- [Backup Services](#)

 Lock It Down

By securing your system, you make it harder for would-be attackers to invade your machine. The software, tools, and

 Go To Class

The best way to protect yourself from attacks is to educate yourself. Virginia Tech and other groups in our area

Acceptable Use Policy
All users of the Virginia Tech network must abide by this policy.

Report a Violation
Send an e-mail to the Office of Judicial Affairs.

Security News

- » [Security hole in Java may expose servers](#)
- » [BUGS 4.0.1](#)
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- » [The Microsoft Web Outage: What Went Wrong? \(article\)](#)

Provided by [Security Focus](#)

Other Security Sites

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Questions?
